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This paper seeks to evaluate the role of the European court of Justice in respect of the third pillar of the 
European Union. With five rulings in the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
to date and several others pending, it is already clear that the Court has made its mark on this still 
fledgling agenda.  Despite the shortcomings of the system of judicial protection and remedies in respect 
of the third pillar it would seem that the ECJ has the potential to exert a strong pro-integrationist 
influence over a field that is riddled with institutional and conceptual complexities and tensions – the 
extent to which this is feasible and desirable will be discussed in the paper. In addition, the paper will 
offer a critique of the legal reasoning of the Court and draw some conclusions about the broader impact 
of its rulings on internal criminal policy. 
 
Outline Plan 
-  Context, constraints and expectations 
-  Third pillar jurisprudence to date  
-  Critique and future challenges 
 
Introduction 
Despite its limited and disparate jurisdiction, a small but significant body of caselaw 
has emerged from the Court
1 in respect of the third pillar since 2003. At the time of 
writing, eight ECJ judgments have been delivered and numerous are pending. Seven 
judgments have stemmed from references from national courts pursuant to the Article 
35 EU preliminary reference mechanism and one of them was an action for annulment 
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1 In this paper I will refer to the Court of Justice of the European Communities as either the ‘Court’ or 
the ‘ECJ.’ Note the considerably outdated official title of this institution. A more accurate title would 
be the Court of Justice of the European Union.   3
of a framework decision brought by the Commission against the Council pursuant to 
Article 35(6) EU.
2  
 
This early jurisprudence has revealed the Court’s potential for defining the limits and 
principles of EU law in the field of criminal cooperation and for lessening the 
negative impacts of the current institutional and legal settlement. It has shown its 
willingness to interpret third pillar law in such a way as to enhance the level of 
protection that it offers to individuals and as such it may play a crucial role in 
addressing the deficit that appears to emerge from the third pillar policy environment 
to date (ie a counterbalance to the emphasis on effective prosecution and 
enforcement.) However, the assessment and outlook is not all positive. Criticisms 
have been levelled at the Court for adopting an overly functionalist approach and for 
the generally dubious legal reasoning used in its rulings to date. Some of its most 
recent judgments raise important unanswered questions and this uncertainty is perhaps 
exacerbated by the ‘paths of confrontation’
3 pursued by the Court with the majority of 
national governments. Moreover, as long as the limited and disparate jurisdiction 
persists in the third pillar there will be concerns about the ability of the Court to 
ensure legal certainty and coherence in EU law, which inevitably further calls into 
question the legitimacy of the AFSJ project as a whole. To what extent will the Court 
be constrained by the strong intergovernmental tendencies of the executive branches 
of national governments (and their dubious attitude towards the Court as expressed in 
the limited provisions on its jurisdiction in the Treaty)? Can the Court influence the 
                                                 
2 Case C-176/03, Commission v Council (Judgment of 13 September 2005) action for annulment 
brought under Article 35(6) EU seeking annulment of Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 
27 January 2003 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (OJ 2003 L 29/55). 
3 D Chalmers, ‘Editorial- The Court of Justice of the Third Pillar’  (2005) ELRev  30(6) at 774   4
paths of integration in PJCC and help to secure a fair balance between the often 
seemingly competing objectives of freedom, security and justice?  
In a field as contentious as this, it is right that the Court should come under close and 
sustained scrutiny. 
 
ECJ in the third pillar: Constraints, Context and Expectations  
 
Institutional and decision- making 
 
The institutional dynamic of the EU’s third pillar has evolved considerably as the 
EU’s role in criminal matters has developed over the decades. The role of each of the 
key institutional actors has been transformed incrementally as Treaty amendments 
rethink the constitutional objectives and limits associated with criminal law 
cooperation. No more is this evolution more striking than in respect of the ECJ. 
 
 Of course in the very early phases of inter-governmental cooperation in (what later 
became known as) ‘justice and home affairs matters’ which, in criminal matters is 
often traced back to the Trevi Group
4 established in 1975, cooperative activity fell 
outside the scope of EC law completely. Even the Schengen project, which was 
developed in response to the security implications of the Community single market 
project and which contained provisions on police and criminal cooperation, developed 
outside the realms of the EC and therefore beyond the judicial control of the ECJ. 
JHA cooperation was formally welcomed into the newly-created European Union fold 
by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. JHA matters were therefore brought within a more 
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formal and organised legal setting, although their location within a separate 
intergovernmental pillar of the Union, ensured that they would not be subject to the 
checks and balances associated with the traditional Community process.  According to 
Article K(2)(c) of the Maastricht Treaty the ECJ had no mandatory jurisdiction over 
third pillar matters whatsoever. Rather an extremely limited degree of judicial review 
could be established if the Council decided to confer such jurisdiction by way of a 
third pillar Convention; prompting heated debate over each instrument, often causing 
delay.  This miniscule and optional role for the Court emphasised clearly the 
continued reluctance on the part of some national governments to subject this highly 
sensitive policy field to any comprehensive, overarching judicial control. 
 
Within a matter of several years however, a political consensus had been reached to 
enhance the role of the Court over justice and home affairs issues. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam also re-thought the legal boundaries of JHA issues, dividing them 
between the first and third pillar so that criminal matters were now the exclusive 
concern of the third pillar.  Distinctive legal procedures and mechanisms were to 
continue to apply to both first and third pillar JHA issues and a newly created EU 
objective of maintaining and developing an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) became the focus of the, now ‘cross-pillar’, JHA policies.  
 
In respect of the third pillar, the Treaty of Amsterdam directly conferred powers on 
the European Court of Justice over criminal matters for the first time. This marked a 
positive step in achieving greater accountability and legitimacy in a policy field that 
appeared increasingly prevalent, both legally and politically, at the EU level. 
However, as will become clear from an overview of the Court’s powers, its   6
jurisdiction remains severely limited when compared to its role in the Community 
pillar.  
 
First and perhaps foremost, Article 35 EU provides for the possibility of a dialogue 
between national courts and the ECJ in third pillar matters. The ECJ is empowered to 
give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and 
decisions, the interpretation of conventions and the validity and interpretation of 
measures implementing them. This preliminary reference procedure is however more 
limited than its Community law counterpart in Article 234 EC and is different again 
from its JHA counterpart in Title IV EC (which deals with matters of civil law 
cooperation, visas, immigration and asylum).
5 Article 35 EU does not confer 
compulsory jurisdiction on the ECJ, rather Member States can choose whether they 
wish to recognise the Courts jurisdiction at all (in which case it must make a formal 
declaration) and if so, the extent of that jurisdiction. Member States are free to choose 
whether only national courts of final instance can refer questions to the ECJ
6 or 
whether  any national court may do so.
7 These choices will of course impact 
significantly on the numbers of references made, the extent of delay involved in the 
search for a judicial remedy and even the content of the questions referred (lower 
courts being traditionally less conservative and more ‘anti-authoritarian’ than higher 
courts.) Furthermore it is noteworthy that no national court is obliged to refer a 
question to the ECJ pursuant to the third pillar preliminary reference procedure.
8 The 
                                                 
5 See Article 68 EC. The fragmentation of the preliminary reference system within the EU legal order 
is problematic and compromises the right to judicial protection. See T.Tridimas, ‘Knocking on 
Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ 
(2003) 40 CMLRev 9. 
6 Article 35(3)(a) EU 
7 Article 35(3)(b) EU 
8 This is in contrast to the procedure established in Article 234 EC where courts of final inastance are 
obliged to refer. Interestingly it also differs from provisions on jurisdiction of the ECJ in respect of 
AFSJ issues in Title IV EC, whereby preliminary ruling requests are limited to the Courts of final   7
UK, Denmark and Ireland have not submitted declarations pursuant to Article 35 EU 
and therefore do not accept the jurisdiction of the Court at all. This is also the case for 
eight of the ten accession Member States, the exceptions being Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Of those States who have submitted declarations all have accepted 
that any national court may refer questions to the ECJ, with the exceptions of Spain 
and Hungary who limit this possibility to their courts of final instance. It is clear that 
these variable positions create a system of ‘patchy justice’ that threatens to undermine 
the rule of law.  
 This variable and permissive jurisdiction might be seen as a manifestation of state 
power, however Guild and Peers argue that in reality it reveals states’ anxieties about 
the ECJ’s possible expansive jurisdiction to third pillar instruments which would 
effectively undermine their control and empower individuals.
9 Interestingly, the 
Court, in its first preliminary reference pursuant to Article 35 EU has, used this 
opportunity for dialogue with a national court to explore, at a general level, the nature 
of the EU legal order and its impact upon the national legal systems, suggesting that, 
despite the limitations placed upon this judicial procedure, it may still provide the 
conduit for the development of EU law generally; in this sense it shows early signs of 
mirroring the role of Article 234 EC in the development of the Community legal order 
in two ways. First, the Article 234 procedure in practice reflects a hierarchy in the 
judicial relationship between the ECJ and the national courts, enrolling national courts 
as the enforcers and appliers of EC law and, second, preliminary rulings have 
increasingly been held to have either de jure or de facto impact on all national courts, 
                                                                                                                                            
instance, which are traditionally more likely to show deference to the executive. However, certain 
Member States, when making a declaration pursuant to Article 35 EU have reserved the right to make 
referral mandatory in respect of national Courts of final instance in their national legislation. 
9 Note that his argument is made in the context of Title IV EC but could equally apply to the third pillar 
of the EU.  E.Guild and S.Peers, ‘Deference or Defiance? The Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction over 
Immigration and Asylum’ in E.Guild and C.Harlow (eds) Implementing Amsterdam   (Hart Publishing, 
2001) pp. 267-289.   8
and not simply on those with which it is in direct dialogue.
10 It will be interesting to 
see the extent of engagement between the national courts and the ECJ pursuant to 
Article 35 EU, which in turn will reveal the degree of acceptance and integration of 
the third pillar doctrine at the national level.
11 
 
A second head of jurisdiction was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The Court 
has jurisdiction in direct actions brought under Article 35(6) EU to review the legality 
of third pillar framework decisions and decisions.
12 These actions may be brought by 
a Member State or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement 
of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the EU Treaty or any rule of 
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
13 While the grounds of review are 
identical to those contained in the equivalent annulment action provision in the EC 
Treaty (Article 230 EC), the measures subject to review are more limited and fewer 
actors have standing to commence an action. Notably, there is no possibility for 
individuals to bring an annulment action before the court, thereby denying any direct 
judicial remedy to individuals in respect of EU criminal matters.  
 
Third and finally, the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 35(7) EU) conferred wider 
jurisdiction on the ECJ in the settlement of disputes among the Member States 
regarding the interpretation or application of all acts under the third pillar.
14 This 
procedure resembles the Article 227 EC dispute resolution mechanism. The ECJ shall 
                                                 
10 See P. Craig and G.de Bũrca. ‘EU Law: Text Cases and Materials’ (3
rd ed) (OUP, 2003) pp. 432-479 
11 Weiler has analysed the preliminary reference procedure in terms of compliance of the Member 
States and has noted that it implies a double acceptance. J.H.H.Weiler, The Constitution of Europe 
(CUP, 1999) 188-218. 
12 See Case C-176/03 Commission v Council. This case is discussed later. 
13 An action must be brought within 2 months of publication of the measure challenged. 
14 The Court’s jurisdiction applies whenever the dispute cannot be settled by the Council within six 
months of it being referred to that institution by one of its members.   9
also have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 35(7) to rule on any dispute between 
Member States and the Commission regarding the interpretation or application of 
third pillar conventions.
15 This is reminiscent of the Article 226 procedure in 
Community law, although the scope of the EU equivalent is exceptionally narrow, it 
being applicable only to disputes regarding the inter-governmental measures known 
as ‘conventions.’ The effective absence of an infringement procedure in the third 
pillar suggests that the Member States were reluctant to establish any form of 
mechanism to expose their failings or to secure the effective and timely 
implementation of legislative measures. This reveals something about the nature of 
and perceived expectations created by the vertical legal relationship between the EU 
and the Member State and necessarily has an impact on the horizontal inter-
institutional dynamic of the third pillar (limiting the traditional roles of the 
Commission and the Court in ensuring respect for EU law). Another notable gap in 
judicial accountability, also of significance to the institutional balance, is created by 
the absence of any equivalent to the Article 232 EC procedure which allows the Court 
to review the legality of a failure to act on the part of the European Parliament, 
Council or Commission. 
 
 The Treaty makes one sphere of action untouchable as far as the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ is concerned. Article 35(5) EU excludes the Court from reviewing the validity or 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement 
services of Member States or Member States’ acts relating to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security. The purpose behind the inclusion 
of this provision in the Treaty was to be absolutely explicit that the Courts jurisdiction 
                                                 
15 The procedure applicable to dispute resolution under Article 35(7) EU is to be found in Article 109b 
of the Court’s Rules of Procedure.   10
did not extend to purely national operations in the sphere of law enforcement and 
internal security.      
 
For the sake of completeness it is to be noted that the raft of judicial mechanisms 
contained in Article 35 EU (implicitly) apply in full to the (as yet to be activated) 
enhanced cooperation procedure provided for in Article 40 EU. Indeed, under Article 
40(3) EU the Treaty states explicitly that all of the powers conferred on the Court by 
the EC Treaty shall apply in the enforcement of the enhanced cooperation mechanism. 
  
This overview of the procedural and substantive restraints conferred on the Court by 
the Treaty suggests that the Court has only limited powers to hold the political 
institutions, the acts of those institutions and the Member States to account, in 
comparison with the judicial system established pursuant to the Community legal 
order.
16  In particular one notes the very limited possibility for individuals to seek 
judicial redress in respect of third pillar matters. Moreover, when one considers the 
governance pattern of the third pillar more generally, it becomes clear that judicial 
control and accountability over criminal law developments is in fact miniscule. It is 
clear that a notable feature of the institutional dynamic in the third pillar is the 
prevalence of executive power. In addition to the strong position of the European 
Council in driving the agenda and the Council of Ministers in the decision-making 
process there is an ever-increasing degree of executive power conferred upon other 
‘quasi-institutions’, agencies and bodies.  A raft of EU level police and judicial 
                                                 
16 Moreover, the Court has strictly applied the procedural limits on its own jurisdiction in respect of 
reviewing the acts of institutions under the third pillar; See Case C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust [2005] 
ECR I-2077. The Court declared inadmissible, actions for damages brought by national or legal 
persons alleging that they had sustained damage as a result of action by institutions in this field; CFI 
(order of 7 June 04) Case T-333/02 Gestoras Pro-Amnista and Others v Council, not reported; CFI 
(order of June 7, 2004) Case T-338/02 Segi and others v Council  [2004] ECR II-1647.   11
agencies now have a role to play in third pillar issues, most notable of course are the 
EU coordinating bodies of Europol and Eurojust. Formal and structured lines of 
accountability, both political and judicial, are conspicuously absent in respect of these 
operational agencies. It has been suggested that Eurojust should be granted a 
supervisory role over Europol, in line with the basic principle that police powers 
should be subject to some form of judicial supervision and control. While this 
argument and broader issues of judicial accountability (involving the ECJ or possibly 
a special ‘panel’ of the Court of First Instance) may be resisted as long as neither 
institution has direct EU powers of criminal investigation and prosecution, these 
questions will have to be revisited in the likely event of this happening in the future.
17  
 
This overview of the powers of the Court in the third pillar reveals that some of the 
‘intergovernmental culture’ of restricting judicial control at the European level clearly 
persists post Amsterdam.
18 The limited and discretionary jurisdiction of the Court is 
problematic from the perspective of securing the uniform interpretation and 
application of EU law and has the potential to undermine legal certainty and the rule 
of law. In a policy field which ultimately concerns the protection and restriction of 
individuals, it is particularly disappointing that they have no recourse to judicial 
protection by the ECJ as of right.  Guild and Carrera point out that the legitimacy and 
legality of an area of freedom, security and justice depend on individuals being able to 
rely on, and challenge EU measures in this field.
19 
                                                 
17 As Europol has gained a greater presence in operational policing, plans have emerged to confer 
executive powers on this body for the first time. 
18 J.Monar, ‘The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs’ 
(2001) JCMS 39(4) 747-64 at 760.  
19 E.Guild and S.Carrera, ‘No Constitutional Treaty? Implications for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ CEPS Working Document No. 231/October 2005 available via http://www.cepsd.be at 4   12
Despite these constraints, certain expectations about the role of the Court might be 
said to arise as a result of the wider decision-making procedure in the third pillar. In 
particular the unanimity requirement for the adoption of legislation has encouraged a 
compromise culture based on the lowest common denominator – the prospect of 
references to the ECJ to interpret and flesh out the content of the often broadly 
construed legal measures is important in this context. And where the decision-making 
procedure results in stale-mate, the ECJ may take the opportunity, as it has done so 
often in the history of Community legal order, to encourage and enable the continued 
pursuit of the policy agenda. Besides, the legislative agenda, police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters proceeds by way of operational activity and other 
forms of institutional coordination activity. As the prospect of conferring EU 
executive powers on third pillar agencies nears, it will be crucial to consider how to 
secure the appropriate safeguarding of civil liberties and the possibility of judicial 
remedies at the European level. 
 
Further consideration of a legitimate role for the Court in criminal matters will be 
explored below. For now, attention returns to the EU constitutional reform context 
and the on-going process of institutional transformation that this promises. While the 
precise nature of the future powers of the ECJ in third pillar issues remains unclear, a 
consensus has now emerged at both the European and national level that increased 
judicial control over this field should be secured. 
 
Institutional reform: With and without the EU constitution 
The inter-institutional dynamic of the third pillar has evolved with successive Treaty 
developments, and further reform is likely given the political appetite for such, as   13
revealed during the latest round of (ultimately fruitless) EU constitutional reform. 
However, despite the evolving nature of the institutional dynamic it is possible to note 
two general characteristics of the EU institutional system in relation to the third pillar; 
first, that EU cooperation in criminal matters has strengthened (national) executives 
and executive power, at the obvious expense of legislatures, courts and voters
20 and 
second, that the resulting system of EU governance in this field is institutionally 
biased towards the politics of negative, as a opposed to positive, integration.
21 In such 
a context, it would be tempting to conclude that the potential role of the Court is so 
limited as to be insignificant. However, this would be premature. In fact, on the 
contrary, it might be suggested that the Court has the potential to influence these 
overriding dynamics. In respect of the first characteristic, that of strengthened 
executive power, the Court, albeit acting with limited jurisdiction, is in a position to 
act as a counterweight to the intergovernmental ‘empire’. It could, if it chose to do so, 
forge a path of integration that was at odds with the national executives.
 22 As for the 
second characteristic, that of the institutional bias towards negative integration, the 
Court might directly or implicitly encourage the legislature to pursue further positive 
integration measures. This may assist in rallying the political support required to 
overcome the demands of the decision-making process in the third pillar, which 
effectively confers a veto power on individual national governments and severely 
limits the role to be played by the European Parliament. It may also help to secure a 
higher ‘minimum’ protection standards, ‘minimum rules’ being the stipulated 
                                                 
20 This phenomenon, which runs counter to conventional accounts of the impacts of international 
cooperation which emphasise loss of state autonomy and transfers of sovereignty, has been 
acknowledged and theorised by a growing number of scholars of EU politics: see A.Moravcsik, ‘Why 
the European Community strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Institutions’  
(1994) Cambridge Centre for European Studies, Working Paper Series 52; and K. Wolf, ‘The New 
Raison d’État as a Problem for Democracy in World Society’ European Journal for International 
Relations 5(3) (1999) 333-363 
21 S.Lavanex and W.Wagner 
22 Indeed, as we will see later, it has chosen to do this in a number of cases (Pupino and Commission v 
Council)   14
benchmark for approximation/harmonisation legislation in this field.
23 Currently, the 
unanimity requirement all but secures a lowest common denominator approach, but it 
is possible that the Court might provide a ruling which affects the substantive content 
of a potential legislative measure, by providing a more protectionist interpretation of a 
provision or principle than might otherwise have been agreed by national executives 
in the legislative process.
24 
 
The major reforms of the Constitutional Treaty – the abolition of the pillar structure, 
the creation of a single EU legal order with the standardisation
25 of the decision-
making procedure, legislative instruments and judicial procedures, the enhanced role 
for national parliaments in the decision-making process and the insertion of the EU 
Charter of fundamental rights as a justiciable component of EU law – would have 
been felt nowhere more heavily, and it is contended, nowhere more positively, than in 
the field of EU criminal matters (ie the third pillar.) More specifically, the 
Constitutional Treaty extended the full range of judicial mechanisms usually 
associated with the mainstream Community pillar to all AFSJ matters.
26 This is a 
                                                 
23 Article 31(e) EU 
24 In several of its rulings to date, the Court has been asked to interpret the principle of ne bis in idem as 
laid down in the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. The adoption of a third pillar 
legal instrument dealing with this principle has been on the legislative agenda for some time - Green 
Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings 
COM(2005) 696, Brussels 23.12.2005. See also the Annex to the Green Paper SEC(2005) 1767, 
Brussels, 23.12.2005. The Court’s rulings must be taken into account when drafting a forthcoming 
framework decision. At a general level, they are likely to provide political impetus for the adoption of 
the legislative instrument. More detailed analysis of the cases is provided later in this article. 
25 Albeit with specific, limited exceptions. 
26The specific limitation currently contain in Article 35(5) EU would remain in respect of criminal 
matters: Article III-377 states that “the ECJ shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or 
proportionality of operations carried out by police or other law-enforcement services, or the exercise of 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and 
the safeguarding of internal security.” The retention of this judicial scrutiny exception has been 
criticised. Most notably, the House of Lords opined that “the Court (ECJ) should have jurisdiction over 
all EU Justice and Home Affairs matters, including co-operation in relation to criminal law and 
procedure…. Such matters may impinge directly on the interests and rights of the individual. The Court 
should be entitled to measure the legality of action, whether that of the Union or of the Member States 
and their authorities when implementing Union legislation, against the norms contained in the Charter   15
significant and hugely positive development particularly in light of the problems 
associated with the current, limited and disparate jurisdiction of the Court. However, 
following failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty and on the assumption that the 
Constitutional Treaty provides a useful snapshot of political consensus in an on-going 
dialogue of constitutional reform and direction, attention inevitably turns to 
alternative options for improving the scope of judicial oversight in the third pillar. 
Three options present themselves in this regard. 
 
First, the fullest exercise of discretion by Member States as regards the Article 35 EU 
preliminary reference procedure would secure a more coherent and hence more 
legitimate judicial system and remove any potential for non-participating States to 
ignore the rulings of the Court. The Hague Programme, offered a clear political 
endorsement of the amendments made in the Constitutional Treaty to the ECJ and 
‘underlines the importance of the ECJ in the relatively new area of freedom, security 
and justice.’   In light of this political commitment to empower the Court, there would 
appear to be no excuses for the continued situation of ‘variable geometry’ regarding 
the preliminary reference procedure. Those Member States that have yet to do so are 
urged to acknowledge the fullest possible acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court 
by way of Article 35 EU declaration at the earliest opportunity. 
Second, the Hague Programme suggested that a more formal solution might be 
appropriate to improve the situation in respect of preliminary rulings, possibly by 
                                                                                                                                            
(of fundamental rights).” House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘The Future Role of the 
European Court of Justice,’ 6
th Report of Session 2003-04 at para. 123   16
amending the Statutes of the Court, and it called upon the Commission to bring 
forward a proposal to this effect.
27   
 
Lastly, an alternative and/or additional means of achieving enhanced judicial 
protection in respect of EU criminal matters lies in the activation of the existing 
Article 42 EU. This ‘passarelle’ provision has been described by Kostokopoulou as 
the ‘Communitarisation constant’ in the third pillar which could not fail to exercise a 
‘serious gravitational pull’ away from the intergovernmental reflexes that continue to 
dominate.
28  Article 42 EU enables the Council, acting unanimously, to decide that 
action in the areas referred to in Article 29 EU (third pillar) shall fall under Title IV 
EC (first pillar). The European Commission has announced that it will make a formal 
proposal to transfer the third pillar into the first pillar.
29 
 
The advantage of making such a transfer would be to bring third pillar policies under 
a single, more coherent and effective, legislative and judicial framework. However on 
closer inspection, the activation of Article 42 EU raises numerous legal complexities 
and queries.
30 Here, it is worth remembering that Title IV EC is itself subject to 
variations on traditional Community governance patterns, hence its description as a 
‘ghetto’ within the Community legal system. So, for example a complex system of 
legal flexibility exists in respect of Title IV EC. Three Member States, Denmark, 
                                                 
27 Vervaele calls for an amendment to the Statute of the Court to provide for urgent proceedings and 
specialised Court sections. See J.A.E Vervaele, ‘European Criminal Law and General Principle of 
Union Law’ Research Papers in Law 5/2005, European Legal Studies, Belgium, 2005 
28 ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the European Union’s Constitutional Dialogue’ 
(Find citation) 
29 The European Parliament in May 2004 called for the Commission to draw up a proposal on the basis 
of Article 42 EU, calling for the transfer of third pillar action to fall under Title IV EC and requiring 
that such action to be decided on by qualified majority. 
30 For a full consideration of the legal issues surrounding the activation of Article 42 EU, see S.Peers, 
‘Transferring the Third Pillar’ Statewatch Analysis, 15 May 2006, available via 
http://www.statewatch.org.   17
Ireland and the UK have each secured legal opt-outs that reflect their individual 
concerns about participating in and being subject to Community developments in 
Title IV policy domains. Another variation, as mentioned earlier, lies in the field of 
judicial powers. For the most part, the normal Community powers of Court 
jurisdiction apply in respect of Title IV EC – indirect actions in the form of the 
preliminary reference procedure and direct actions in the form of annulment 
proceedings against Community measures and infringement actions against the 
Member States for breach of Community law. However, exceptions apply in respect 
of the preliminary reference procedure whereby only final instance national courts can 
send references to the Court (although this remains an obligation in line with the 
approach in Article 234 EC). This represents a more restricted system than the third 
pillar equivalent which enables lower courts to refer questions to the Court. The 
second exception and one that is familiar to the third pillar is the limit on the Court’s 
jurisdiction over matters relating to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.  
 
The question of the ‘transferring’ the third pillar has focused more specifically upon 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ and has become bound up with the duty on the Council, 
pursuant to Article 67(2) EC to adapt inter alia the Court’s powers in Title IV EC.  
The Commission has expressed its view that the role of the Court of Justice’ as 
regards Justice and Home Affairs should be aligned with the general scheme of EC 
jurisdiction. Certain Member States are reluctant
31, and the ECJ has recently entered 
                                                 
31 Including the UK and Germany. See House of Lords Select Committee Report.   18
the debate.
32 The Council is now under some pressure to take action and extend the 
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 67 (2) EC.  
 
An Article 42 EU decision could significantly increase the judicial control of third 
pillar matters, notably empowering individuals (albeit subject to the contentious rules 
on standing) to bring a direct action before the Court and providing a mechanism to 
hold recalcitrant Member States to account. But this perhaps remains an unlikely 
development.  In practical terms, the activation of Article 42 EU may be problematic. 
Not only does it require unanimous approval by Council, but it may also be subject to 
national ratification procedures in line with the wording in Article 42, that the Council 
‘shall recommend the Member States to adopt that decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.’ This double approval system has led some 
commentators to suggest that, in fact, there is not much difference between the Article 
42 EU procedure and a Treaty amendment.
33 
 
AFSJ – changing concepts of security, predominance of prosecution in legislative 
development 
 
A further contextual factor likely to influence the role played by the Court in third 
pillar matters is the overarching objective of maintaining and developing the EU as an 
‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). Adopting its familiar teleological 
approach to judicial interpretation in the realm of EU policing and criminal law, the 
Court would quickly arrive at this AFSJ objective. This now familiar ‘mantra’ was 
included as an objective in the European Treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
                                                 
32 Council Doc 7646/07 
33 E.Guild and S.Carrera, ‘No Constitutional Treaty? Implications for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ CEPS Working Document No. 231/October 2005 available via http://www.cepsd.be at 9   19
order to provide a new focus and direction for the European Union going into the 
twenty-first century. Article 2 EU states that the objective is to ‘maintain and develop 
the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of 
persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.’ 
Article 29 EU states that the ‘Union’s objective shall be to provide citizens with a 
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice…’  
 
One starting point for understanding this concept is to separate out the strands of 
‘freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘justice’ and study the raft of policy areas that might be said 
to contribute to each of them. Indeed this is the approach taken in the early Vienna 
Action Plan (1998) and more recently in the Hague Programme (2004).
34 However, 
this advocates a rather rigid and narrow understanding of the individual concepts 
which fails to appreciate the extent to which they inter-relate and overlap in practice. 
For example that, immigration issues ‘promote freedom’, and have no bearing on 
security issues is something, in reality, we all know to be incorrect.  
 
Of course, on one level, the pursuit of a definitive definition as such is futile – the 
term is abstract and imprecise, and therefore capable of any number of interpretations. 
Individually and collectively these concepts remain contested. Conway contends 
provocatively that since these provisions do not mean anything specific, ‘they can 
mean whatever the Court would like them to mean.
35 However, it is equally clear how 
                                                 
34  These documents refer to policy issues and priorities under the broad headings of ‘freedom’, 
‘security’, ‘justice’ and ‘external relations.’ The Tampere Conclusions by contrast, were structured 
around four broad milestones (common EU asylum and migration policy, a genuine area of justice, a 
Union-wide fight against crime and stronger external action) 
35 Conway makes this assertion in the context of the Gozutok ruling in which the Court appears to have 
invoked the AFSJ in a general way to justify a particular interpretation of the principle of ne bis in   20
a particular interpretation or understanding of the concept might impact upon policy 
agendas and be used by the Court to justify more expansive or indeed more limited 
interpretation of those policies. It will be interesting to see the extent to which the 
Court is influenced by the developing political context in this regard– where a clear 
tension has emerged between the rhetoric of pursuing a balanced agenda and the 
reality of a legislative and operational agenda dominated by security considerations. 
To what extent will it apply existing ‘securitised’ patterns of understanding and to 
what extent will it attempt to forge a new understanding of the objective that might 
influence the future direction and content of EU policy developments? 
 
The evolution of European cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs matters from the 
mid 1970s to date is notable for the extent and pace of change. However, one thing 
emerges as constant – the prominence of ‘security’. That is not say that the concept of 
security has remained the same or is uncontested (quite the contrary in fact
36), but 
rather, as Kostokopoulou explains it, that a ‘securitisation ethos’ has characterised 
justice and home affairs cooperation since its inception.
37 The ‘Europeanisation of 
security’ in recent years has lead to the conceptualisation of policy agendas in terms 
of actual or potential security threats (in particular immigration and free movement of 
persons) – this in turn has had an impact upon the structure, methodology and content 
of the JHA agenda.
38 Following the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks the security impetus took 
on a new and reinvigorated dynamic – the internal and external security policies of the 
EU became inextricably linked and the ‘counter-terrorism’ agenda has been used to 
                                                                                                                                            
idem. The Court did not attempt to argue that that its interpretation was necessarily required by it. 
G.Conway, ‘Judicial Interpretation and the Third Pillar: Ireland’s acceptance of the European arrest 
warrant and the Gozutok and Brugge case’ (2005) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Justice 13(2) 255-283 at 281 
36 Walker – insert reference 
37 Insert reference and reference to Bigo’s ‘security continuum’ 
38 Anderson and Apap – insert reference   21
focus police and judicial cooperation activity in criminal matters. A whole raft of 
operational and legislative measures have been adopted or proposed on the basis of 
this particular security threat (with the result that ‘security’ appears, at times to be 
synonymous with ‘terrorism’.) Indeed, a broad survey of the legislative measures and 
progress in operational matters in the third pillar reveals a control and prosecution-
oriented agenda over and above any protectionist and individual rights-based 
approach. While internal security issues have transcended the traditional state domain  
and emerged prominently on the EU political scenes - albeit in mutated forms and 
within contested parameters – there is an increasingly widespread concern that this 
transformation has emerged without providing a sufficient ‘“compensating” 
normative frame of legitimation.’
39 The EU policy environment exists ‘beyond the 
embedded liberalism of the nation state’
40 (Guild, 2004) and with an emphasis on 
security-maximizing actors rather than actors concerned with the safeguarding of 
individual rights (Lavanex and Wagner) the EU process contributes to a securitization 
of issues. The institutional and decision-making environment with its emphasis on 
executive power and unaccountable operational agencies contributes to the creation 
and the sustenance of this trend. The imbalance recorded in these agendas has been 
highlighted by a growing number of academics and it may be that the Court will play 
a role in balancing this agenda more equitably.
41 Through the clarification of 
competences and the provision of legal interpretations, the Court might contribute to a 
clearer conception and more coherent application of the EU as an AFSJ. It might 
usefully define the ‘application range’ of the internal (and external) security 
                                                 
39 S.Lavanex and W.Wagner Limerick paper at 5 
40 E.Guild, ‘Crime and the EU’s Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
10(2) (2004) 218-234 
41 Insert references – Lenaerts and Jadoul at 200   22
strategy.
42 The adoption of a language of rights (extending beyond the fundamental 
right to freedom of movement) might influence the direction of future policy and 
secure a more balanced, normative frame of reference for the development of EU 
integration in criminal matters. Finally, as in the internal market field, the Court might 
encourage a sluggish and reluctant legislature to adopt measures of positive 
integration to secure acceptable conditions for the application of negative integration.  
 
To summarise the first section of this paper, the unique and contested legal and 
political environment within which the Court finds itself acting reveals both 
constraints and opportunities. Besides the formal limits on the judicial power imposed 
by Title VI EU, the wider legal characteristics of the third pillar in comparison with 
those of the Community legal order arguably point to a more conservative and 
constrained role for the court in exercising its powers of review and interpretation. On 
this view, one might expect the Court to show a high degree of deference to the will 
of the national governments as expressed in the EU Treaty and the emergent 
legislation and to interpret EU powers restrictively to prevent any further diminution 
of or ‘encroachment’ on national competences. The principles of legal certainty and 
specificity of criminal law might also militate against a more creative interpretation of 
EU criminal law provisions, on the ground that such an approach would be less 
predictable. 
43 Yet, simultaneously, the limited and contested nature of the legal and 
political environment might encourage a bold and more dynamic jurisprudence from 
the Court. The greatest challenge here will be to ensure that that its caselaw is 
consistent, coherent and rational.  
                                                 
42 Storbeck and Toussaint – highlight that despite the fact that the concept of internal security is hotly 
contested and that there is no clear application range for the development of such a strategy, the EU 
continues to pursue it with some vigour.  
43 G.Conway, op.cit at 271   23
 
Third pillar jurisprudence to date 
 
Interpretation of the principle of ne bis in idem contained in Articles 54-58 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) of 1990.  
 
Three of the five third pillar judgements to date and several of the pending cases 
before the ECJ concern the interpretation, not of a post 1999 third pillar measure but 
rather of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) of 1990, and 
in particular Articles 54-58 thereof, which deal with the principle of ne bis in idem
44. 
This instrument, originally adopted outside the auspices of the EU framework became 
an integral part of it following the Amsterdam Treaty. In the new legal context of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice the transnational principle of ne bis in idem 
contained in CISA emerges as a crucial safeguard, particularly in the absence of any 
common approach to jurisdiction and is coming under fresh scrutiny. Persistent calls 
for EU legislation to strengthen and clarify the ne bis in idem principle
45 have been 
met with the publication of a Green Paper on ne bis in idem and the related issue of 
parallel criminal jurisdiction in December 2005.
46 The Commission has yet to publish 
a draft Framework Decision.
47 Meanwhile, and in the absence of an appropriate EU 
legislative response, the national courts have asked the ECJ for assistance in 
interpreting the principle pursuant to the Article 35 EU preliminary reference 
mechanism. The Court’s approach appears to be one of maximising the level of 
                                                 
44 The Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments 
of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French 
Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. Signed on 19 June 1990 at 
Schengen, Luxembourg. See Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus 
Brügge, [2003] ECR I-1345, Brügge, Case C-469/03 Filomeno Mario Miraglia, [2005] ECR I-2009, 
Case C-436/04 Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333, Case C-467/04 Gasparini judgement 
of 28 September 2006 (nyr), Case C-150/05 Van Straaten judgment of 28 Spetember 2006 (nyr).   
Further preliminary rulings are pending on the interpretation of the CISA ne bis in idem rule in Case C-
288/05 Kretzinger and Case 367/05 Kraaijenbrink, Opinion delivered on 5 December 2006. Case C-272/05 
Bouwens was removed from the Court’s Register by the President by an Order of  7 June 2006 
following an indication by the referring Belgian court that a preliminary reference was no longer 
necessary in light of the judgment made in Van Esbroek.  
45 See for example the Mutual Recognition Programme of December 2000 at point 1.1. OJ C-12/10, 
15.01.2001 
46 Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings 
COM (2005) 696, Brussels 23.12.2005. See also the Annex to the Green Paper SEC (2005) 1767, 
Brussels, 23.12.2005. A Greek proposal for a Framework Decision on ne bis in idem in 2003 (OJ 
[2003] C100/4) was not seriously pursued largely due to its limited scope and the retention of 
numerous exceptions to the principle. 
47 The official consultation period established by the Green Paper ended in March 2006 – this always 
looked over ambitious. A period of further reflection and consultation is under way as initial responses 
to the Green Paper called for more empirical evidence to determine the extent to which parallel 
prosecutions really are a problem within the EU. Pre-legislative efforts to improve the content of a 
particular measures takes on an added significance in a legal environment that lacks a post-legislative 
enforcement mechanism to bring recalcitrant Member States before the ECJ   24
protection owed to the individual suspect by the principle by adopting a broad and 
consistent interpretation of the scope of the CISA ne bis in idem principle (and in 
particular the crucial concepts of ‘bis’ and ‘idem.’). Importantly, the cases also reveal 
how the ECJ conceives of the AFSJ more generally. It goes without saying that any 
emergent legislative instrument on ne bis in idem will have to take account of the 
ECJ’s now substantial jurisprudence on the CISA principle.  
 
The following discussion of the cases will be divided along thematic lines – namely 
those concerning the concept of ‘bis’, (that is the types of decisions which have the 
effect of precluding future proceedings on the same matter) and second, the concept 
of ‘idem’, (that is the appropriate comparator for the determination of whether an 
individual has been tried twice for the same alleged violation of the law.) 
 
‘bis’ 
In the  words of 54 CISA what constitutes a ‘trial’ that has been ‘finally disposed of’ 
in 54 CISA? Three ECJ judgments provide a clear and broad interpretation which can 
be summarised as follows: The 54 CISA ne bis in idem principle precludes further 
criminal proceedings in a different Member State following any decision (either 
convicting or acquitting the accused), which, in the jurisdiction in which it was 
handed down, has the effect of in principle precluding further proceedings in other 
MS. One ECJ judgment – Miraglia – outlines the limits of the scope of application of 
the principle. 
 
•  Gözütok and Klaus Brügge marked the first time that the Court responded to a 
preliminary reference in the context of the third pillar and the first opportunity 
for the Court to interpret the CISA. In this case the ECJ was asked to decide 
whether a financial settlement procedure that discontinued proceedings and 
barred further prosecution in one Member State, but which did not involve a 
court process or a judicial decision as such, could bar further prosecution in 
another Member State pursuant to 54 CISA. In other words did this “out of 
court” settlement procedure constitute a trial ‘finally disposed of’?  The Court 
said yes, ruling that the principle ‘also applies to procedures whereby further 
prosecution is barred, such as the procedures at issue in the main actions, by   25
which the Public Prosecutor of a Member State discontinues criminal 
proceedings brought in that State, without the involvement of a court, once the 
accused has fulfilled certain obligations and, in particular, has paid a certain 
sum of money determined by the Public Prosecutor.’ (para.48.) The Court was 
clearly not concerned with the form of the procedures, and so the absence of a 
court and a judicial decision did not cast doubt on its interpretation.
48 Rather, 
it placed some emphasis on the sanctioning character of the settlement or 
decision (compliance with financial payment in this case, which, when met, 
could then be regarded as a penalty which had been enforced) and the effects 
of the procedure in the national legal system (that it constituted a prohibition 
on further criminal prosecution). 
•  Miraglia 
In Miraglia, the Court was again asked to clarify the types of final decisions 
which would trigger a ne bis in idem effect. In this case criminal proceedings 
against Mr Miraglia were instituted concurrently before the Italian and 
Netherlands judicial authorities in connection with drug trafficking offences. 
Relevant authorities in both Italy and the Netherlands had cooperated in the 
investigation of the alleged criminal activity. The Netherlands prosecutors 
closed proceedings against Miraglia on the grounds that proceedings in respect 
of the same facts had been brought in Italy only then to refuse judicial 
cooperation to the Italian authorities on the basis of Article 54 CISA. In effect, 
the CISA principle had been used to prevent effective criminal proceedings 
being brought against Mr Miraglia anywhere. The Court held that a decision 
which discontinued national proceedings prior to any adjudication on the 
merits of the case, on the sole ground that proceedings had earlier been 
initiated in another Member State against the same defendant and for the same 
acts ‘cannot constitute a decision finally disposing of the case against that 
person’ within the meaning of Article 54 CISA
49. As we will see in a moment, 
                                                 
48 The Court later explained at paragraph 40 its reasons for disregarding the judicial form of the 
decision. Essentially, if the principle could not be extended to those simplified procedures which are 
capable of barring further prosecution, then the principle would only be of benefit to those defendants 
who are guilty of more serious offences, for which the use of simplified procedures is usually 
precluded. 
49 In one sense this ruling confirms that not all decisions barring further prosecution according to the 
law of the Member State in which it is given should produce a ne bis in idem effect in other Member 
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the reasoning in this case was similar to the reasoning in Gozutok but the ECJ 
arrived at a different conclusion. It thereby confirmed that not all decisions 
barring further prosecution according to the law of the Member State in which 
it is given should produce a ne bis in idem effect in other Member State. An 
important consideration for the Court appears to have been that the judicial 
decision in question had been taken with no assessment whatsoever on the 
merits. However it would be wrong to read into this judgement a general rule 
to the effect that the Article 54 CISA principle only applies to decisions 
following an assessment on the merits of the case.
50  In fact, in its judgement 
in the later case of Gasparini the ECJ clearly rejected such a position.    Rather 
the Court in Miraglia was saying that it would be wrong to rely upon 54 CISA 
itself and interpret its provisions in such a way that the alleged criminal 
conduct might never be considered. 
 
•   van Straaten 
 
In van Straaten, the third ECJ decision that concerned the type of decisions 
covered by 54 CISA, the applicant had been acquitted for lack of evidence. It 
was suggested that such an acquittal did not constitute a decision finally 
disposed of and therefore should not give rise to ne bis in idem protection 
because the issue of factual guilt and innocence remained outstanding. The 
ECJ however, was able to conveniently sidestep the merits or demerits of this 
suggestion
51 by simply focusing on the actual effect of the decision in the 
jurisdiction in which it was handed down. If the effect was to render the 
applicant innocent and thereby end criminal proceedings in that Member State, 
that was sufficient to constitute ‘bis’ within the meaning of 54 CISA, and bar 
any further criminal proceedings in other Member States pursuant to the 
principle of mutual recognition.  
 
•   Gasparini 
 
                                                 
50 Although this was suggested by AG Sharpston in Gasparini at para 97. 
51 Which, as Loof points out, would require it deal with the difficult question of whether the absence of 
evidence of guilt necessarily implies the absence of guilt.   27
The fourth case, Gasparini, which was delivered on the same day as the 
judgment in van Straaten, concerned a judicial decision to abandon criminal 
proceedings on grounds that the prosecution for the offence was time barred 
under national law.  With reference to its ‘settled caselaw’
52 it held that final 
acquittals based on the fact that prosecution is time-barred pursuant to national 
criminal law could be included with the scope of Article 54 CISA (para. 28).
53 
This was quite a radical decision in that it confirmed that the principle of ne 
bis in idem could apply on a transnational basis to cases that have been finally 
closed in one Member State even where there has not been any consideration 
of the case on its merits – ie final disposal on mere procedural grounds is 
sufficient – and it did not matter that there is a wide diversity of national rules 
on time-bars to prosecution, where they exist at all in national criminal 
jurisdictions. 
  
–‘idem’/‘same act’ 
•  van Esbroeck 
In Van Esbroeck the Court was faced with the question of whether the export of 
narcotic drugs from one Member State and import of the same drugs into another 
Member State are to be considered the ‘same act’ under Article 54 CISA.
54 Van 
Esbroeck, a Belgian national was sentenced to imprisonment by a Norwegian 
Court for importing drugs into Norway. After serving part of his sentence, he was 
conditionally released and escorted to Belgium, where he was prosecuted and 
sentenced to imprisonment for the export of the same drugs. For the ECJ, the only 
relevant criterion for the purposes of the application of the concept of ‘the same 
acts’ within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA is the identity of material acts. 
Neither the legal classification of the acts or the protected legal interests were 
                                                 
52 Gozutok and Brugge, para.38 and Van Straaten, para.57 
53 That finding is not affected or undermined by Article 4(4) of the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision 2002/584, which permits the executing judicial authority to refuse to execute a 
European Arrest warrant inter alia where the criminal prosecution of the requested person is time-
barred according to the law of the executing Member State and acts fall within the jurisdiction of that 
state under its own criminal law (at para 31.) 
54 The Court also considered the scope ratione tempore of Article 54 CISA. On this point it held that  
“the ne bis in idem principle must be applied to criminal proceedings brought in a Contracting State for 
acts for which a person has already been convicted in another Contracting State even though the 
Convention was not yet in force in the latter State at the time at which that person was convicted, in so 
far as the Convention was in force in the Contracting States in question at the time of the assessment, 
by the court before which the second proceedings were brought …” para 43   28
relevant in determining whether a person had been tried twice for the ‘same acts.’ 
As was pointed out by AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his opinion in Van Esbroek, it 
seems obvious that ‘a criterion based on the legal classification of the acts or on 
the protected legal interest might create as many barriers to freedom of movement 
within the Schengen territory as there are penal systems in the Contracting 
States.'
i  A legal approach would render any transnational application of the 
principle of ne bis in idem virtually impossible.  The Court went on to give the 
national courts some useful guidance on what constitutes ‘same acts’ - The Court 
then concluded that the only relevant criterion is the identity of the material acts, 
understood in the sense of the existence of a set of facts which are inextricably 
linked together … in time, in space and by their subject-matter. (reading paras 36 
and 38 together.) Applying such an interpretation to the facts in hand, the Court 
held that the import and export of the same drugs could in principle be regarded as 
the same acts for the purpose of 54 CISA.  
 
A similar factual definition of ‘idem’ was confirmed in van Straaten and has been 
recommended by Advocate General Sharpston in two pending cases.
55  
 
•  van Straaten 
•  Kretzinger (AG Opinion) 
•  Kraaijenbrink (AG Opinion) 
 
 
ECJ Reasoning 
 
The Court has rapidly developed some settled caselaw on the scope of 54 CISA. The 
reasoning in its first decision of Gozutok is applied consistently in its later caselaw 
with occasional further elucidation of this reasoning and occasional reference to other 
justifications. Because of the centrality of the Gozutok reasoning to all of the cases I 
will begin by discussing this case. 
 
                                                 
55 Case C-288/05 Kretzinger  which concerns the concept of enforcement (Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston delivered on 5 December 2006) and Case C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink which concerns 
the taking into account of earlier penalties (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 5 
December 2006.)   29
Reasoning in Gozutok 
The Court justified this broad interpretation of the 54 CISA by conceiving of it as 
imposing mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal proceedings. In so doing it 
takes its first opportunity to endorse the principle of mutual recognition, hitherto 
confirmed by Europe’s political leaders, as the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The Court’s argument is rather formalistic here. It begins by 
acknowledging that neither Title VI EU, nor the Schengen Agreement, nor CISA, 
require, for the application of Article 54 CISA, any ‘harmonisation, or at least the 
approximation, of the criminal laws of the Member States relating to procedures 
whereby further prosecution is barred.’ (para 32.) ‘In those circumstances,’ there is a 
‘necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal 
justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other 
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law 
were applied.’ (para 33.) Accordingly the provisions of CISA are to be interpreted on 
the basis of an assumption that Member States have mutual trust and confidence in 
each other’s legal systems.   
 
Next the Court adopts its familiar interpretive technique of invoking the principle of 
effet utile of provisions (in this case Article 54 CISA) in order to support its findings. 
It suggest that its own wide interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle is the only 
interpretation which gives useful effect to the ‘object and purpose of Article 54 CISA’ 
rather than to procedural or purely formal matters, which, after all, vary as between 
Member States. Crucially then, what did the Court consider the ‘object and purpose of 
Article 54 CISA’ to be?   
 
At paragraph 38 of its judgment the Court held that – ‘Article 54 of the CISA, the 
objective of which is to ensure that noone is prosecuted on the same facts in several 
Member States on account of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement, 
cannot play a useful role in bringing about the full attainment of the objective unless it 
also applies to decision definitively discontinuing prosecutions in a Member State…’   
 
It reached this understanding of the CISA principle by considering it within the 
broader legal context of the EU’s third pillar. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
integration of the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU, Article 54 CISA   30
had become part of a new, broader integration objective of maintaining and 
developing the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice in which the free 
movement of persons is guaranteed and protected. – an objective outlined in Article 2 
and 39 EU 
 
The key components of the Gozutok reasoning can be summarised as 
-  the endorsement of MR as an implicit consequence of an application of 
54 CISA, - with reference to the absence of a harmonisation 
precondition - this means diversity in MS criminal justice systems can 
be embraced by CISA principle because the application of the principle 
is not made conditional upon any requirement for harmonisation and 
the principle itself necessarily implies mutual trust and therefore 
mutual recognition of the criminal law in force in other Member States 
even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were 
applied. Securing the objectives of the principle therefore demands an 
approach that looks beyond procedural and purely formal matters that 
very often vary between Member States, to the substance and impact of 
the decision in question. 
 
-   object and purposed of 54 CISA being inextricably linked to achieving 
FM within an AFSJ  
 
-  and the need to endorse a broad interpretation of the scope of the 54 
CISA principle as the only way of securing the useful effects of the 
object and purpose of Article 54. 
 
This reasoning was followed in van Straaten. It confirmed that a failure to include a 
decision acquitting the accused for lack of evidence within the ambit of 54 CISA 
would have the effect of ‘jeopardising the exercise of the right to free movement’ 
(para. 58) However the court went further and added that it would also ‘undermine the 
principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations.’ (para. 59) 
   31
In Gasparini, with reference to the ‘settled caselaw’
56 it reiterates the objective of 
Article 54 CISA - that it seeks to ensure that no-one is prosecuted for the same acts in 
several Member States on account of the fact that he or she exercises free movement 
rights. It explains in more detail that “it ensures that persons who, when prosecuted, 
have their cases finally disposed of are left undisturbed. They must be able to move 
freely without having fear of a fresh prosecution for the same facts in another 
Contracting State.” (para. 27) The Court also points to provisions of  the European 
Arrest Warrant Framework decision (2002/584) to support its finding that acquittals 
on time bar grounds fall within the scope of 54 CISA. In particular, pursuant to 
Article 4(4) the ne bis in idem principle can act as a ground for non-execution of a 
European arrest, including where the criminal prosecution of requested person is time 
barred according to the law of the executing Member State and the acts fall within the 
jurisdiction of that State under its own criminal law. (Para. 31.)  
 
The true significance of the judgement in Gasparini is revealed only when read in 
conjunction with Advocate General Sharpston’s well-argued Opinion of 15 June 
2006. For AG Sharpston, answering the question of whether the 54 CISA principle 
included decisions acquitting the accused because their prosecution for the offence is 
time barred “requires the Court to define one of the fundamental aspects of the ne bis 
in idem in Article 54 of the CISA…, namely whether the principle can apply only 
where the first court reached its decision after an assessment of the merits.” (Para. 3 
of the Opinion). She usefully presented the ECJ with a “stark choice” between a 
“substance-based approach” which would entail some examination on the merits 
within the context of the first prosecution and a “procedure-based approach” which 
necessitated no such examination of the merits of the case and which would enable 
any bar to further proceedings in the first jurisdiction to trigger the application of ne 
bis in idem and so bar proceedings in all others. The Advocate General came down in 
favour of the former, while the Court chose the latter. In so doing it actively endorsed 
a specific choice of direction for the EU in developing an AFSJ through criminal law.  
 
In considering the concept of ‘idem’ the Court has applied its settled Gozutok 
approach in addition to finding support in the wording of the Article 54 CISA in order 
                                                 
56 Gozutok and Brugge, para.38 and Van Straaten, para.57   32
to justify a broad factual approach to the concept of ‘idem’.  In endorsing the Gozutok 
“pro-free movement” objective of Article 54 CISA, it elaborated on the link between 
Article 54 principle and FM by citing the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer: 
‘That right to free movement is effectively guaranteed only if the perpetrator 
of an act knows that, once he has been found guilty and served his sentence, 
or, where applicable, been acquitted by a final judgment in a Member State, he 
may travel within the Schengen territory without fear of prosecution in another 
Member State on the basis that the legal system of that Member State treats 
the act concerned as a separate offence.’ (para 34.)  
 
The Court went on to justify a factual approach to ‘idem’ by reference to the wording 
of Article 54 CISA as compared to the wording used in other international treaties 
which enshrine the ne bis in idem principle  -  which seem to endorse a legal 
classification approach. For instance, the Court notes that reference in the ECHR 
principle to “offence” implies that the criterion of the legal classification of the acts is 
relevant as a prerequisite for the applicability of the ne bis in idem.
57   
 
A similar factual definition of ‘idem’ was confirmed in van Straaten and has been 
recommended by Advocate General Sharpston in two pending cases.
58  
 
The reasoning of the Court might be criticised on three grounds 
-  absence of reference to the principle as a fundamental individual right 
to due process. In arriving at its broad interpretation of ‘bis’ and ‘idem’ 
the ECJ did not place emphasis upon the need to positively protect 
individuals against the ius puniendi of the state per se. Rather, it 
                                                 
57 However note that reference to “offence” in the definition has not prevented the European Court of 
Human Rights from adopting an idem factum approach. See Franz Fischer v Austria, confirmed in W.F 
v Austria. Unlike the ECJ however, its interpretation of idem is not consistent and indeed by its own 
admission appears contradictory. See J.A.E Vervaele Utrecht Law Review 2005 at 102.  Reference to 
“offence” in the principle as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is rather unfortunate 
in this regard. 
58 Case C-288/05 Kretzinger  which concerns the concept of enforcement (Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston delivered on 5 December 2006) and Case C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink which concerns 
the taking into account of earlier penalties (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 5 
December 2006.)   33
emphasised, in a rather more functional way, the need to protect and 
promote the individual right to freedom of movement within the AFSJ 
-  The automatic assumption approach to mutual recognition and mutual 
trust has been revealed in the literature and in practice.
59 Indeed, the 
Tampere and Hague programmes accept that MR must go hand in hand 
with other types of approach – ie harmonisation measures, 
strengthened practical cooperation and mutual learning. And yet the 
court points to the absence of any explicit requirement to harmonise to 
support the wholesale implicit endorsement of the principle of MR 
-  link between 54 CISA and securing FM – might be criticised on 
practical and conceptual grounds -  
. 
  The Court’s case law appears to endorse a vision of the AFSJ which prioritises 
freedom of movement above all else. However a wider conception of the AFSJ better 
explains the Court’s interpretation of the principle than simply “freedom of 
movement. ” In fact a closer look at the caselaw reveals that the ECJ does consider 
other factors besides ‘free movement’ in deciding upon the appropriate scope of the 
54 CISA principle. For instance in Van Straaten the ECJ justified a broad 
interpretation of ‘finally disposed of’ - to include a decision acquitting the accused for 
lack of evidence – because failure to do so would undermine the free movement 
objective and the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.
60 Moreover 
in Miraglia the ECJ appeared to weigh the free movement objective of the AFSJ 
against other Treaty expressed dimensions of the AFSJ, the ‘prevention and 
                                                 
59 A blanket assumption of mutual trust is arguably problematic, at least in practice. For a critique see 
A.Weyembergh, ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague 
Programme’ (2005) CMLRev 42 1567-1597 at 1575; S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law 
in the European Union: Has the Council Got it Wrong?’ (2004) CMLRev 41 5-36. Rather, mutual trust 
must be built and secured through positive measures and cannot be simply implied or assumed. In other 
words the conditions for the smooth and effective application of mutual recognition must be created. 
The AFSJ strategy, as developed by the Council and the Commission now appears to acknowledge the 
need to ‘build’ trust through a variety of different approaches, including the adoption of harmonising 
legislation in respect of criminal procedures and practical, non-legislative measures such as judicial 
training and personnel exchange schemes. See Communication on the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters and the strengthening of mutual trust between Member States 
COM(2005) 195. For an analysis of the role of mutual trust and the means of achieving it in the context 
of the third pillar see G.de Kerchove and A.Weyembergh (eds) La Confiance Mutuelle au sein de 
l’Espace pénal Européen. Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area (Éditions de L’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2005) 
60 See Case C-150/05 Van Straaten, judgement of 28 September 2006 (nyr) at para. 59.   34
combating of crime’ and the ‘attainment of a high level of safety’
61 in coming to its 
decision. Here the Court appeared to acknowledge that the promotion the free 
movement of persons sits alongside an equally important objective of ensuring that 
free movement rights are exercised with an AFSJ where there is a high level safety 
and in which crime is effectively controlled.
62 In Miraglia the Court appeared to give 
priority to the latter objective over the former in order to prevent Article 54 CISA 
being relied upon to prevent any effective consideration of the alleged criminal 
conduct. It can be seen therefore that the Court’s reasoning in Miraglia was similar to 
that in Gozutok, except that by emphasising the multiple components of the AFSJ 
(securing the free movement of persons in addition to the prevention and combating 
of crime) it came to the opposite conclusion. In summarising the judgment in her 
Opinion in the later case of Gasparini  AG Sharpston says that the “Court gave 
priority to the need to ensure the penalisation of the crime, and placed less emphasis 
on promoting the free movement of persons.” (at 39) Wasmeier and Thwaites draw 
out the implications in terms of the principle of mutual recognition by saying that the 
judgement makes clear that mutual recognition approach is not an aim in itself, but 
that it may be limited by the objectives of Article 2 and 29 EU: i.e. ne bis in idem is 
not necessarily to be applied in all situations where a further prosecution is barred 
according to the relevant national law, as this could run contrary to the objective of 
providing citizens with a ‘high level of safety.’”
63 
 
In any case, relying solely upon the protection of the freedom of movement to justify 
its interpretation of Article 54 CISA is problematic. Loof argues that there is no 
necessary material link between the risk of multiple prosecutions and the freedom of 
movement, citing the example of the ‘dual sovereignty’ doctrine of the US Supreme 
Court  and the possibility of a trial can going ahead without the accused even being 
present, or even knowing about it, and this for reasons unrelated to the accused’s 
willingness to exercise her or his freedom of movement.  He further argues that from 
a conceptual point of view there is a problem or at least confusion in determining the 
scope of ne bis in idem by reference to  FM - the question of whether an individual 
                                                 
61 Enshrined in Article 2 EU. See Miraglia at para. 34 
62 Article 2 (1) EU objective which is “to maintain and develop the Union as an AFSJ in which the free 
movement of persons in assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to … 
prevention and combating of crime.” 
63  At 571   35
should be tried or not is always logically prior to the question of whether she or he 
should enjoy freedom of movement.  Within a particular jurisdiction, an individual 
only enjoys freedom of movement as long as she or he cannot legitimately be 
detained.  The same must pertain mutatis mutandis within the EU area of free 
movement.  It follows that the legitimacy of criminal proceedings against a particular 
individual cannot be determined with reference to freedom of movement.  Duplicitous 
criminal proceedings in different jurisdictions within the AFSJ are therefore 
intolerable but not because they potentially affect an individual’s willingness to 
exercise her or his freedom of movement, but because they risk undermining   
structural integrity of a single area of freedom security and justice.  
  
To sum up, to date the ECJ has interpreted the 54 CISA ne bis in idem principle with 
clarity and consistency. Although some important issues remain to be clarified
64 there 
is already settled caselaw on the definitions of key concepts such as ‘bis’ and ‘idem’. 
This degree of certainty is most welcome and, interestingly, appears to be in stark 
contrast to the ECHR caselaw on the interpretation of the Article 4, Protocol 7 
principle which reveals a somewhat chaotic approach to the concept of ‘idem’ and 
which has yet to reveal anything definitive of the concept of ‘finally acquitted or 
‘convicted’. The diverging interpretations in applying the principle of ne bis in idem 
both within the EU legal order (the ECJ’s approach in the field of competition law 
differs to its approach in respect of 54 CISA) and beyond (a different approach again 
is adopted by the ECHR for example) are to be expected. The ne bis in idem principle 
takes on a different meaning and function according to the legal framework within 
which it applies.
65 So, the interpretation of the 54 CISA principle that one finds in the 
ECJ’s caselaw to date represents a unique understanding of that principle – one which 
is influenced and informed by a prexisting legal construct (EU third pillar) which 
comes with its own distinctive objective (the creation of an AFSJ) and underpinning 
principles (mutual recognition). 
                                                 
64 scope of the enforcement principle, the extent to which administrative punitive fines might fall within 
the scope of the principle and the limits of the exceptions to the principle contained in CISA - 
Undoubtedly, a variety of intricate legal problems can stem from different interpretations of the ne bis 
in idem principle by different jurisdictions. For example, problems may arise from the practice unique 
to civil law jurisdictions which allows for an appeal by the prosecutor against acquittal as part of ‘one 
trial.’ The precise meaning and scope of the principle may therefore only emerge in time when tested 
on a case-by-case basis. 
65 Drawing upon social contract theory Loof demonstrates how the ne bis in idem principles contained 
in the ECHR and 54 CISA are in fact “completely different animals.”   36
 
The impact of the ECJ 54 CISA caselaw, in terms of maximising the level of 
protection owed to the individual suspect by this fundamental principle, is also 
welcome. The broad scope of  ‘bis’ - to include any procedure finally disposing of a 
case in the national jurisdiction, whether or not there has been a consideration  of the 
dispute on the merits - and the factual approach to ‘idem’ drawn by the Court will in 
practice enhance the level of protection of individual human rights in transnational 
justice.  
 
 
Interpreting a Framework Decision: the Pupino case 
 
In the recent Pupino case, the European Court of Justice was called upon for the first 
time to interpret a framework decision adopted pursuant to the EU’s third pillar 
entitled Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.  The question referred 
from the (lower) Italian Court concerned the interpretation of Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA on the Standing of victims in criminal proceedings. The most 
remarkable part of the Court’s judgement however did not relate to the particular 
interpretation of the Framework Decision in question, but rather to its consideration of 
the admissibility issues. The impact of the Court’s ruling in this regard is of 
constitutional significance. It held that the principle of interpretation in conformity 
with Community law as established by the Court in a series of cases in the 1980s, 
beginning with Von Colson, was applicable to framework decisions adopted under 
Article 34 EU.  It did this by relying upon several arguments 
First, the Court invokes a purposive interpretation of Article 34(2)(b) EU.  It suggest 
that the binding character of framework decisions confers on national authorities, and 
particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with 
them. It bases this finding on the similarity in wording between Articles 34(2)(b) EU   37
and 249(3) EC but it does not attempt to explain why it is able to apply an identical 
interpretation to provisions that occur within distinct legal orders. 
 
Second, invoking similar reasoning as it had done decades earlier in its Von Colson
66 
ruling, the Court justified the extension of the principle of consistent interpretation (at 
least in part) by relying upon the Article 10 EC principle of loyal cooperation. The 
Court’s reliance upon the principle of loyal cooperation as a basis for the principle of 
harmonious interpretation is particularly notable because it was not hitherto clear that 
such a duty existed in the context of the EU. Previously, the principle, contained in 
Article 10 EC had been regarded as Community principle. In the absence of an 
express Treaty provision to that effect the Court had to infer a duty of loyal 
cooperation from the incredibly broad and general provisions of both Article 1 and 
Title VI of the EU Treaty. Despite the absence of explicit textual support for the 
existence of this latter principle in the context of the third pillar, the Court, adopting a 
purposive interpretation of the EU Treaty (Article 1 EU and Title VI EU) held that ‘It 
would be difficult for the Union to carry out its tasks effectively if the principle of 
loyal cooperation…were not also binding in the area of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters’
67 It follows from this judgement that the principle of 
loyal cooperation contained in Article 10 EC “is of general application and is 
especially binding in the area of JHA governed by Title VI of the EU Treaty, which is 
moreover entirely based on cooperation between the Member States and the 
institutions.”
68
  It remains to be seen what precise duties will be deduced from this 
                                                 
66 Case 14/83 Von Colson & Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 
67 Pupino at Para 42.  
68 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, judgement of 12 
December 2006, paragraph 123   38
principle by the ECJ in the context of the third pillar in the future.
69 Of course, one 
noteworthy difference immediately apparent from the first and third pillars in respect 
of this principle relates to enforcement. In the first pillar Community context, were a 
Member State to breach its Article 10 EC duties it would be possible for the 
Commission to bring an action against it under Article 226 EC. However, this 
mechanism to bring recalcitrant Member States before the ECJ is not repeated in the 
third pillar. no similar provision for direct actions against Member States making 
legal enforcement of the principle of loyal cooperation impossible.
70  
 
Third, the Court at Paragraph 36 suggests that support for the contention that 
framework decisions should have similar (indirect) legal effects to EC directives can 
be derived from an implied intention on the part of the authors of the EU Treaty. It 
held that it is ‘perfectly comprehensible’ that the authors of the EU ‘should have 
considered it useful to make provision, in the context of Title VI of the Treaty, for 
recourse to legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for by the EC 
Treaty, in order to contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s objectives.’ 
Moreover this implication was possible ‘irrespective of the degree of integration 
envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe within the meaning of Article 1(2) EU.’ The Court here 
seems to be suggesting that even prior to the developments made to the EU’s third 
pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the authors of the EU Treaty, back in the early 
                                                 
69 It will be interesting to see the extent to which the Court pays deference to the power balance as 
expressed in the third pillar (whereby power lies mostly with national executives and horizontal 
practical and operational cooperation between national police and judicial agencies is a key objective.) 
Respect for the existing power balance would most likely see the development of duties falling upon 
the EU institutions and agencies, whereas duties of cooperation upon the Member State authorities 
would perhaps support a consolidation of power towards the EU. In Pupino we see the ECJ doing the 
latter. 
70  
   39
1990s, would have supported the Courts finding, today, that EU framework decisions 
can have indirect effects similar to those of EC directives. In other words, although 
they did not provide so explicitly, the Treaty authors would have intended that 
framework decisions give rise to indirect effects. This assumption by the Court does 
not have any clear textual support either in the Treaty or in the form of travaux 
preparatoires.
71 Rather it is based upon its own interpretation of what is required to 
achieve the effective pursuit of the Union’s objectives.  The flimsy nature of the 
Court’s legal reasoning here is compounded by its failure to acknowledge the already 
existing Treaty-based distinction between the legal effects of directives and 
framework decisions – that is, according to Article 34(2)(b) EU, framework decisions 
cannot create direct effect.  
 
Finally, the Court also argued that its own jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
under Article 35 EU would be deprived of ‘most of its useful effect’ if individuals 
were not entitled to invoke framework decisions in order to obtain a conforming 
interpretation of national law before the courts of the Member States. The Court 
suggested that the importance of this jurisdiction is exemplified by the possibility for 
any Member State to submit observations to the Court even if they have not accepted 
the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 35(2) EU.
72 The use of this policy 
based effet utile argument is perhaps not surprising; it has often been used by the 
Court to justify the development of remedies in Community law.
73 In the specific 
context of the third pillar, arguments relating to the effet utile of provisions might be 
                                                 
71  According to the method of historical interpretation of the EU Treaty, the Court would seek to 
determine what the Treaty authors originally intended, by relying upon some supporting preparatory 
text or texts.  
72 The Court does not however acknowledge that the importance of the procedure may stem from the 
fact that judicial remedies in respect of Title VI are curtailed more generally. 
73 For example it was relied upon to extend direct effect to directives (Van Duyn), develop the 
Community principle of harmonious interpretation (Von Colson) and introduce the concept of state 
liability for breach of Community law (Francovich).   40
regarded as more persuasive than they are in the Community context. This is because 
the third pillar does not possess a structured mechanism (similar to Articles 226-228 
EC) to deal with recalcitrant Member States. In other words the full effect of third 
pillar measures cannot be guaranteed through the application of an infringement 
mechanism and therefore the invocation of a canon of construction that gives a legal 
provision its fullest effect appears more plausible. It is conceivable that the 
jurisdiction of the Court to give preliminary rulings pursuant to Article 35 would be 
undermined (ie could not achieve its fullest effect) if individuals were not able to rely 
upon framework decisions indirectly (ie through national law.) There would be no 
obvious need or point in providing an interpretation of a measure that could not create 
some form of binding legal effect. Interestingly, the Court does not talk about a total 
deprivation of useful effect but rather a deprivation of ‘most’ of the useful effect of its 
preliminary reference jurisdiction. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that its 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings extends beyond the scope of offering 
interpretations of framework decisions. Whereas, the duty of harmonious 
interpretation as developed by the Court in Pupino applies to framework decisions, 
national courts can still refer a question to the ECJ, pursuant to Article 35 EU, about 
the interpretation of decision  or a convention, or any implementing measures. 
Moreover, the question referred from the national court may concern the validity 
rather than the interpretation of the measure. Therefore, the preliminary reference 
procedure under Article 35 EU has a much wider scope than the interpretation of 
framework decisions and so the absence of a duty of harmonious interpretation in 
respect of framework decisions could not deprive it of its full effet utile.  
   41
It would appear from this brief analysis of the Court’s reasoning that the Court has 
invoked rather inventive means to justify a ruling of constitutional significance. With 
rather limited textual support in the EU Treaty the Court has relied heavily upon 
explicit and implied connections and similarities between the EC and EU treaties. 
Indeed it might even be said that the Court interpreted the EU Treaty in the light of 
the acquis communautaire. 
 
Having found that the duty of harmonious interpretation applies in respect of 
framework decisions, the Court went on to discuss the inherent limits of that duty and 
the possibility that those limits may prevent a solution being found to the dispute in 
the main proceedings. It reiterated that the obligation is limited by general principles 
of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity. These prevent, for 
instance, the obligation from leading to the criminal liability of persons who 
contravene the provisions of a framework decision from being determined or 
aggravated on the basis of such a decision alone, independently of an implementing 
law.
74 However, the Court made clear that the reference before it does not concern the 
extent of the criminal liability of the person concerned (as raised by the French 
Government in its observations) but rather the conduct of the criminal proceedings 
and the means of taking evidence. The Court clarified further that the duty ceases to 
apply in circumstances where it would lead to an interpretation of national law contra 
legem, hence the reference to apply the duty ‘so far as possible.’ However, the duty 
requires that, where necessary, the national court consider ‘the whole of national law’ 
                                                 
74 See for example, in relation to Community directives, Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-129/95 X [1996] 
ECR I-6609, paragraph 24, and Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others 
[2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 74. Judgment of 3 May 2005. In respect of the impact of the principles 
of direct and indirect effect in national criminal proceedings, the Court has previously held that these 
principles cannot be applied to worsen the position of a criminal suspect as regards substantive criminal 
law, although they can be applied to alter a suspect’s position (whether positively or negatively) as 
regards criminal procedure.    42
in order to assess how far it can be applied in such a way as not to produce a result 
contrary to that envisaged by the framework decision.
75  This more detailed 
explanation of the extent of the duty upon the national court is reflected in the Courts 
final ruling, which reads, ‘the national court is required to take into consideration all 
the rules of national law and interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the 
wording and purpose of the Framework Decision.’ The Court’s ruling does however 
leave some questions unanswered as regards the precise scope of the duty of 
consistent interpretation. This is perhaps not so surprising in the circumstances. The 
Court appeared content to refer to the duty in so far as it had previously been 
developed in the Community context. Moreover, pending before the Court at the time 
was the case of Mangold,
76 in which the Court was specifically required to address the 
temporal scope of the duty. 
 
This important ruling sheds light on the legal consequences of framework decisions 
and reveals more fundamentally, a new legal conception of third pillar cooperation. 
The impact of the ruling in terms of judicial remedies for individuals is particularly 
significant. Finally, the judgment is made even more remarkable by the fact that it 
was handed down in the face of opposing submission from seven of the then fifteen 
EU governments. The Court was boldly and not uncontroversially, asserting its 
independent authority over the third pillar.
77 
                                                 
75 This wording is taken from a recent case on indirect effect in the Community context; Joined Cases 
C-397/01 – C-403/01Pfeiffer, judgment of 5 October 2004 (nyr) at paragraph 115. 
76 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Rüdiger Helm. Judgment delivered on 22 November 2005, nyr. 
77 The Court’s ruling provoked reaction and criticism in the national constitutional courts. Judgment of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04) 
German Constitutional Court, in which it declared that the national legislation implementing the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision was incompatible with the German Constitution.  In 
particular the dissenting opinions of Justice Lübbe-Wolff and Justice Gerhardt. Interestingly, the UK 
House of Lords has confirmed the application of the principle developed in Pupino to UK judges. In 
Dabas (Appellant) v. High Court of Justice, Madrid (Respondent) (Criminal Appeal from Her   43
 
Defining the limits of competence: Commission v Council   
Just as Pupino raised issues about the legal relationship between the first and third 
pillars – in the sense of borrowing and applying legal principles – so too does the case 
of Commission v Council.
78 This time, however, the issue is not about sharing legal 
principles but rather of identifying where the divisions of legal competence lie. The 
pillared structure of the Union, as a well as resulting in various complex institutional 
configurations, has also given rise to jurisdictional conflicts owing to divergent 
positions about the correct legal base for an act. The ECJ was recently called upon to 
resolve a so-called ‘pillar battle’ in a case that raised the long-disputed issue of the 
extent of the powers of the European Community in matters of criminal law.
79  In this 
judgment of 13 September 2005 the Grand Chamber annulled Council Framework 
Decision
 2003/80 on the protection of the environment through criminal
 law
80 which 
laid down a number of environmental offences
 in respect of which the Member States 
were required to prescribe
  criminal penalties. It did so on the ground that the 
appropriate legal basis for such measures lay in the Community legal order, and in 
                                                                                                                                            
Majesty's High Court of Justice) [2007] UKHL 6, 28 February 2007, a case concerning the resistance 
of surrender of Mr Dabas pursuant to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill reasoned that in determining how to implement the framework decision “a 
national authority may not seek to frustrate or impede achievement of the purpose of the decision, for 
that would impede the general duty of cooperation binding on member states under article 10 of the EC 
Treaty. Thus while a national court may not interpret a national law contra legem, it must "do so as far 
as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to attain the 
result which it pursues and thus comply with article 34(2)(b) EU" (Criminal proceedings against 
Pupino (Case C - 105/03) [2006] QB 83, paras 43, 47).” (para. 5) 
78 Case C-176/03 (13 September 2005). For analysis see Corstens and Wasmeier and Thwaites 
79 It should be noted that other cross-pillar litigation (between the first and third pillars) has arisen 
prompted by challenges to EC measures: Joined Cases C-317 and 318/04, Parliament v Council and 
Parliament v Commission. Judgment of 30 May 2006; Case T- 306/01 Yusuf and T-315/01 Kadi, 
judgments of 21 September 2005 in which Court of first instance ruled that EC objectives do not 
extend to combating terrorism and Article 308 EC cannot be used to permit the EC to adopt measures 
falling within the scope of the third pillar. These judgments are on appeal. See Peers at 73. 
80 OJ L 29/55   44
particular in Article 175 EC. The Council had previously refused to adopt a 
Commission proposal for a Directive on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law based on Article 175 EC on the ground that the Community had no 
power in relation to criminal sanctions. 
 
The Court first noted that the protection of the environment constitutes one of the 
essential objectives of the Community and that environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community’s 
policies and activities. The Court looked at both the aim and content of the 
Framework Decision and held that the main purpose of the Framework Decision was 
the protection of the environment and that as such, the appropriate legal basis for such 
measures is Article 175 EC. In line with Article 47 EU, which provides that
 nothing in 
the EU Treaty is to affect the EC Treaty, the Court held that the first six articles of the 
Framework Decision encroached on the powers which Article 175 EC confers on the 
Community and therefore the entire Framework Decision should be annulled (it being 
indivisible). 
The Court ruled that, although as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules on 
criminal
 procedure fall within the Community’s competence, that
 does not prevent the 
Community legislature from taking measures
 which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States, when it considers that such measures are necessary to ensure that the 
rules which
 it lays down on environmental protection are fully effective and when the 
application
  of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties
  by the 
competent national authorities is an essential measure
  for combating serious 
environmental offences.
    45
This judgment is the first time the Court has expressly stated that the Community has 
the power to require Member States to establish criminal penalties for a breach of EC 
law.
81 This marks a shift from a more restrained obligation upon Member States to 
enforce Community rules by criminal law pursuant to the principle of equivalence to 
an express Community law obligation to criminalise certain activity.  It is also a very 
clear example of how its role in settling inter-organisational disputes concerning the 
legal basis of legislation can have a direct influence on the legislative process – not 
least because the institutional dynamic in the first pillar is currently very different 
from that of the third pillar. 
 
The judgement might be criticised from several perspectives; 
First, the ruling might be criticised for ignoring the intentions of the Member States as 
expressed in the Treaty. In a recent report on the criminal competence of the EC the 
House of Lords observed ‘that the Court did not seem to pay any great regard to the 
history and the scheme set out in the Treaties.’ Although the EC Treaty contains no 
express power for the Community to adopt criminal law measures and in fact in 
certain provisions, precisely excludes such competence (Article 135 EC and Article 
280(4) EC) the Court simply rules that it is ‘not impossible to infer from this’ that 
‘…any harmonisation of criminal law…must be ruled out.’ The House of Lords report 
notes that the Court makes no reference and apparently draws no inference from the 
separate provisions and procedures on criminal matters laid out in the third pillar of 
the EU. It also suggests that the provisions in the Constitutional Treaty support a 
                                                 
81 Prior to that the Court had ruled that, in accordance with the doctrine of equivalence, which holds 
that the protection of rights under Community law must be ensured by Member States in a way that is 
no less favourable than the protection of similar rights under national law, Member States must impose 
sanctions for breach that are ‘effective, persuasive and proportionate’, which of course, might include 
sanctions of a criminal nature; Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) [1989] ECR 2965.   46
working assumption that the present Treaties contain only a limited power to 
harmonise criminal laws and procedure and that the power is contained in Title VI 
EU.
82 The degree of political consensus against such a ruling is also expressed clearly 
by the eleven national Governments that intervened in the case. Following the 
judgement, the Council and individual national Governments have expressed their 
preference for a limited interpretation of the Court’s ruling and their alarm at the 
Commission’s incredibly broad construction of the ruling.
83 
 
Second, the judgement has left created huge uncertainty as to the precise scope of 
powers of the Community in respect of criminal law. The judgement itself fails to 
offer a clear delineation of competence of the EC’s powers, prompting hugely varying 
interpretations from the ‘supranational’
84 and ‘intergovernmental’
85 camps. The key 
questions raised but not resolved by the judgement are as follows; is the Court’s 
reasoning limited to matters concerning the protection of the environment or might 
the ruling apply to other areas of Community action; does the Community 
competence extend to defining specific offences and penalties for such offences or 
does it merely enable the Community demand that criminal sanctions of some sort be 
imposed over certain types of activity? Is it to be assumed that Community 
competences does not extend to the related questions of jurisdiction, prosecution and 
                                                 
82 See Article III-271(2) which concerns the power to extend the harmonization of substantive criminal 
measures. 
83 Commission Communication on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 
(Case C-176/03 Commission v Council) Brussels, 24.11.2005. COM(2005) 583 final/2. Also see 
Commission Proposal on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights Doc 88/66/06 which was adopted on the strength of its interpretation of the Courts judgement in 
C-176/03. 
84 The Commission and the European Parliament 
85 The Council and the individual Member State Governments. For a summary of the views of the UK 
Government and for a full analysis of the issues raised by this judgment generally see the House of 
Lords EU Committee Report, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European Community’ 42
nd 
Report of Session 2005-06, HL Paper 227, published 28 July 2006.   47
extradition, in which case any relevant Community legislation would require 
‘complementary’ third pillar legislation dealing with these issues?
86 Answers to some 
or all of these questions may be provided by the ECJ in Case C-440/05 Commission v 
Council in which the Commission seeks an annulment of the framework decision on 
ship-source pollution. In order to provide the required degree of clarity it seems likely 
that the Court will have to devise reliable tests to define such terms as ‘an essential 
measure’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘measures which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States’ all of which appear in the key paragraph of its judgement (at 48). In 
the mean time it has been suggested that until these issues are clarified by the Court, 
that there will effectively be a period of political and legislative stagnation.
87 
 
Challenging the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision – Advocaten voor de 
Wereld Case C-303/05 
 
 
On 3 May 2007, the ECJ delivered its judgement in the much anticipated case of  
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Minsterraad.
88 In this case, referred 
from the Belgian Constitutional Court, the Court had been asked to rule upon the 
compatibility of the EAW Framework Decision with the EU Treaty on both 
procedural and substantive grounds. The first of these questions related to the 
appropriateness of the legal basis of the Framework Decision (Article 34(2)(b) EU). 
In particular the referring court was unsure that a framework decision was the 
appropriate instrument bearing in mind the fact that framework decisions were to be 
adopted only for the purpose of the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
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Member States. Second, the Belgian court asked whether the abolition of the double 
criminality verification for certain offences was compatible with Article 6(2)EU, and 
more specifically with the principles of legality in criminal proceedings and the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination. In accordance with the Opinion of  
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, delivered on 12 September 2006, the ECJ 
held that the central legislative instrument of the EU’s mutual recognition approach to 
achieving judicial cooperation in criminal matters – The EAW Framework Decision -  
is indeed legally valid. 
 
In response to the argument that a Convention would have been a more appropriate 
instrument, the Court confirmed that the Council had discretion to decide upon the 
appropriate legal instrument, where, as in the present case, the conditions governing 
the adoption of such a measure are satisfied. In reaching this conclusion the ECJ 
confirmed that the  
 
With regard to the argument concerning compatibility with the principle of legality 
the Court makes clear that Article 2 of the Framework Decision (which abolishes the 
requirement of double criminality fro 32 offences) does not itself harmonise the 
criminal offences in question (in respect of their constituent elements or the penalties 
to be attached). Rather, their exact nature continues to be determined by the Member 
States and it is they who bare the responsibility of respecting the principle of legality 
and fundamental legal principles in the application of the Framework decision. The 
dispensation of verification double criminality does not change the role or obligations 
of the MS issuing the EAW in that respect. 
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In response to the argument that the abolition of double criminality requirement for 
certain offences and not gave rise to unjustified differnce in treatment as between 
individuals and therefore amounted to an infringement of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, the ECJ held that even if on were to assume that the situation of 
persons accused of listed  offences was comparable to the situation of persons accused 
of non-listed offence, that distinction is objectively justified. The Court held that ‘on 
the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in the light of the high degree of 
trust and solidarity between Member States, that, whether by reason of their inherent 
nature or by reason of the punishment incurred of a maximum of at least three years, 
the categories of offences in question feature among those the seriousness of which in 
terms of adversely affecting public order and public safety justifies dispensing with 
the verification of double criminality.’ (Para. 57)  
 
Furthermore the court addresses the argument that the absence of any precise 
definition of what facts constitute those 32 offences gives rise to the risk of disparate 
implementation of the FD across the MS and hence increases the likelihood of 
different treatment. In rejecting that argument the ECJ pointed out that the objective 
of the FD was not to harmonise the substantive criminal law of the MS and that 
nothing in Title VI EU makes the application of the EAW conditional on 
harmonisation of the criminal laws of the MS within the area of the offences in 
question (at para.59). Interestingly, this argument is applied by way of analogy with a 
similar argument made in para. 32 of Gozutok concerning the interpretation of the 
Article 54 CISA ne bis in idem principle. There, it will be recalled, the Court argued 
that nothing in the legal provisions makes the application of 54 CISA principle 
conditional upon the harmonisation of the criminal laws of the Member States and   50
therefore mutual trust and recognition of decisions must be assumed in the application 
of the principle. The argument in Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW is used slightly 
differently – to deny an accusation of discrimination. Here, the ECJ conveniently 
ignores the fact that the EU institutions have deemed it necessary and appropriate to 
harmonise the definitions of and penalties for certain of the criminal offences listed in 
Article 2(2) FD – such as terrorism, human trafficking, money laundering – Arguably 
this is an implicit acknowledgement that a common definition of (some) offences 
would facilitate more effective judicial cooperation between national authorities and 
hence more effective prosecution of crime within the AFSJ 
 
 
It is worth returning briefly to the AG’s Opinion in this case because Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer provided some interesting comments on the role of the 
ECJ in the context of the third pillar. He urges the Court to engage more fully in 
undertaking its role in respect of the third pillar – acknowledging the wider context 
and implications of the third pillar legal framework. At  paragraph 8, having 
mentioned the judicial clashes in numerous legal systems concerning the 
compatibility of the  transposition  of the Framework Decision with constitutionally 
enshrined individual rights, he says “There is, therefore, a far-reaching debate 
concerning the risk of incompatibility between the constitutions of the Member States 
and European Union law, the Court of Justice must participate in that debate by 
embracing the prominent role assigned to it, with a view to situating the interpretation 
of the values and principles which form the foundation of the Community legal 
system within parameters comparable to the ones which prevail in national systems.” 
Later in the Opinion at para 78 the AG argues that the “…Court must break its silence   51
and recognize the authority of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as an interpretative 
tool at the forefront of the protection of the fundamental rights which are part of the 
heritage of the Member States” and makes the point that the protection of 
fundamental rights is equally indispensable in the context of the third pillar as it is in 
the Community pillar. 
 
Critique and future challenges  
 
A legitimate role for the ECJ in the Third Pillar 
The ECJ has at times exercised considerable activism and inventiveness and at times, 
considerable restraint in the context of the Community legal order. Typically, periods 
of judicial activism emerge when the political processes of integration stagnate. 
Conversely, the European judiciary resumes a more restrained role when the cause of 
integration is championed more actively by the political institutions.
89  
 
 In certain policy fields, traditionally sensitive from a national perspective, such as 
social and economic policy, the Court has shown itself more willing to defer to 
national policy choices, at least where they have acted in non-discriminatory and 
proportionate manner. Or indeed, the Court might avoid establishing a Community 
solution altogether where a comparative analysis of an issue reveals profound 
contradictions or disparities between national legal systems.
90 In light of the obviously 
sensitive field of criminal law matters, revealed clearly in the distinctive legal and 
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institutional framework of the third pillar, it is perhaps arguable that the Court should 
exercise a degree of constraint when interpreting and reviewing criminal law 
measures. Conway supports such an analysis. He argues that the continuing sensitivity 
of national sovereignty in this area calls for a more cautious interpretive approach in 
relation to third pillar matters and that the widely accepted principles of criminal law, 
such as legality and specificity, also militate against an inherently less predictable 
creative interpretation of criminal provisions.
91   
 
Particularly difficult is the extent to which choices expressed by national criminal 
justice systems should remain intact in the context of the principle of mutual 
recognition, which itself embraces divergence and the extent to which the latter 
should give way in the pursuit of over-arching principles and interests in the context 
of the AFSJ. Clearly the balance is a delicate one, but the stakes are high: instilling a 
degree of confidence in and respect for the developing legal order of the Union as a 
whole will be crucial if the EU is to avoid a collision course with national 
constitutional courts and political stagnation of the legislative process. Staving off a 
political and judicial backlash is not necessarily always an argument for adopting the 
path of least resistance, rather it is an argument for a strongly argued, principled and 
consistent jurisprudence. 
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Perhaps a focus on safeguarding individual rights as a consistent theme in ECJ 
jurisprudence would be appropriate – both in and of itself and in the light of 
distinctive structural features of third pillar policy making.  
 
 
The ECJ and fundamental rights 
The impact of the Court’s rulings on ne bis in idem and in the Pupino case have 
obvious human rights implication for individuals who find themselves caught up in 
criminal proceedings. However, despite these potentially positive impacts, it is not the 
case that the Court has consistently or comprehensively justified its rulings with 
reference to the advancement and protection of human rights. The ne bis in idem 
principle, in addition to being a tool for securing the principle of legal certainty, is 
also a fundamental safeguard for a suspect facing criminal charges – and yet the ECJ 
failed to justify its rather broad interpretation of the principle in these latter terms, 
preferring to rely on considerations of mutual trust combined with the traditional and 
broad concept of the effet utile of provisions in the wider context of achieving an area 
of freedom, security and justice and the free movement of persons.
92 In Pupino, the 
Court did make reference to respect for fundamental rights (as general principles of 
EU law) as a limit upon the duty of consistent interpretation. It stated that the 
Framework Decision must be interpreted so as to respect fundamental rights, as 
derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. In other words national rules could be 
interpreted in the light of the Framework Decision in order to offer child victims of 
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crime an appropriate level of protection in so far as this would not make criminal 
proceedings against Pupino incompatible with Article 6 ECHR. Dougan suggests that 
this legal limitation will help to ensure that the regime of criminal law adopted by the 
Union will in its turn respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
93  Of course, 
the real beneficiary of the Court’s judgement in Pupino, was unlikely to be Mrs 
Pupino herself. Rather the judgement is likely to have wider human rights 
implications, namely the improved procedural protections of child victims of crime 
and of course, the improved legal protection for individuals to enforce third pillar EU 
rights. 
 
There are several factors that support a more wholelsale adoption of the language of 
rights in the jurisprudence of the Court in the interpretation of third pillar issues.  
 
First, it would reflect the high level political and legal commitment to upholding 
human rights protections in EU law in general an in the development of an AFSJ in 
particular. From a legal perspective, respect for fundamental rights is clearly and 
unequivocally enshrined in the Treaty. Article 6(2) EU confirms that fundamental 
rights are protected as general principles of law, such that respect for fundamental 
rights is a condition for the lawfulness of Union acts
94 and all acts of the institutions 
are subject to review on grounds of respect for fundamental rights.
95 Nowhere in EC 
or EU law are their express derogations from the obligation to respect fundamental 
rights. The EU courts have a duty to ensure respect for fundamental rights. The 
political rhetoric of rights protection is also strong. All of the key path-defining 
documents setting out a vision of the Union’s AFSJ make reference to promoting and 
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95 Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339   55
ensuring respect for fundamental rights and many third pillar legal instruments to date 
refer to human rights and fundamental freedoms in their preambles. Further 
expression of a commitment to strengthening the human rights dimension of the EU 
has come in the form of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which codifies and reaffirms the raft of rights that the Union respects (which 
includes the rights to a fair trial and the principles of ne bis in idem, equality before 
the law and legality of criminal offences). Moreover the Constitutional Treaty 
contains provisions that could have a significantly transformed the promotion and 
protection of human rights by and in the European Union -  it would incorporate the 
hitherto political EU Charter of Rights as a legally binding document within the EU 
legal order and it would make it possible for the EU to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Taken together, all of these developments are 
indicative of a remarkable legal and political commitment to securing and 
strengthening rights protection in the European Union  – and arguably should 
encourage a bolder and more visible place in the legal reasoning of the Court. 
 
 And yet, there are limits and problems. The scope of the recently established EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency does not automatically extend to EU third pillar matters, 
and certain high profile cases have revealed the limits of relying upon the protection 
of rights at the domestic level in the application of principle of mutual recognition in 
judicial cooperation.
96 Most notably, the key legislative proposal introducing 
minimum procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants remains blocked in 
Council. It has been increasingly watered down and a small number of Member States 
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have now put forward a draft political Resolution for agreement, at least in the 
interim.
97 In today’s security climate, politicians tend to focus on the effective and 
efficient prosecution of crime in defence of ‘the public interest.’ Enhancing, or indeed 
even securing rights for individual suspects and defendants is less of a priority. We 
have seen this in the UK in recent years with the speedy adoption of sometimes 
draconian legislation in direct response to the ‘terrorist threat.’ In such a context, the 
role played by the judiciary is crucial. In the UK, the courts have curtailed the 
ambitions of the legislature with reference to the need to take account of human rights 
guarantees. Similarly, one might hope and expect the European Court of Justice to be 
bold in its endorsement of rights protection, even if that is to pursue a path of greatest 
resistance from the national governments. Of course, a failure to do so might result in 
a backlash from national constitutional courts themselves. The behaviour of the ECJ 
is  watched with close interest by both national constitutional courts.  The willingness 
of some national constitutional courts not to subject EC legislative acts to review on 
the basis of national constitutional standards is by no means unconditional. Rather it is 
dependent upon the EU legal order securing an adequate level of rights protection (the 
“Solange” jurisprudence). In a system of cooperation based upon mutual recognition 
which all but prohibits judicial testing on the merits in the country of execution and 
considerably reduces the grounds for refusal – the scope for legal unrest is high. It is 
perhaps inevitable that the room for manoeuvre left to the Member States by the 
mutual recognition legislation will be tested in the national courts – and as we have 
witnessed in respect of the implementation of the EAW framework decision, this will 
often raise questions about constitutionally protected fundamental rights. If and when 
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these cases reach the ECJ, all eyes will be on it - and the ECJ will want to avoid 
undermining the practice of ‘constitutional tolerance’ at all costs.
98 
 
Second, the Court might be more inclined to directly address individual rights in its 
jurisprudence where possible as a reaction against the paradox that lies at the heart of 
the third pillar – in an area where the Union has increased influence and impact upon 
the fundamental rights of individuals, the possibility for judicial remedy for 
individuals has been severely curtailed.
99 Individuals cannot have direct access to the 
ECJ under the limited judicial review provision in Article 35(6) EU and as we have 
seen access to the Court via the preliminary reference mechanism is indirect, typically 
slow and is, in any case not a remedy as of right. National courts may refuse to refer 
questions and some national courts, as in the UK, are unable to take advantage of this 
mechanism at all. This situation is problematic in terms of upholding the principle of 
effective judicial protection and the need for legal certainty. More generally, there is 
something uncomfortable about creating the EU as an area of freedom, security and 
justice in response to citizen’s demands and in order to meet their expectations, while 
denying those same citizens the right to rely on and challenge the measures taken to 
do so.  
 
INSERT ECHR AND BOSPHOROUS 
 
Finally, in support of a more rights-based approach by the Court in respect of the third 
pillar, one can point to the need for the Court to build upon its historical tradition for 
the protection of human rights in the Community sphere within the developing 
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context of the human rights debate in the EU. The ECJ has itself played a crucial role 
in acknowledging and enforcing human rights in the Community context. That role 
should extend to the third pillar bearing in mind the nature of the subject matter and 
notwithstanding the restricted nature of the Court’s powers. One way that the Court 
could demonstrate its commitment to upholding individual rights would be to 
acknowledge the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as an interpretative tool. As 
noted above Advocate General Colomer in Case C-303/05 concerning the validity of 
the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, called upon the Court to do 
precisely this. 
 “…the Court must break its silence and recognise the authority of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as an interpretative tool at the forefront of the protection of the 
fundamental rights which are part of the heritage of the Member States. That 
undertaking must be approached with caution and vigour alike, in the full belief that, 
while the protection of fundamental rights is an essential part of the Community 
pillar, it is equally indispensable in the context of the third pillar, which, owing to the 
nature of its subject matter, is capable of affecting the very heart of individual 
freedom, the foundation of the other freedoms.”
100  
 
AG Colomer in coming to this view rejects the argument that the Charter is devoid of 
any legal force as a result of its status as a ‘political declaration.’ With reference to 
the developmental nature of rights protection in the EU he argues that the Charter 
contains rights that the Union must respect and the Court must protect, in accordance 
with Articles 6 EU and Article 46(d) EU. Moreover, he refers to the fact that 
Advocates General have previously  interpreted the Charter and that the Court of First 
Instance has referred to it in numerous of its judgements. He points to a change of 
direction  in the Court’s own approach to the Charter in the recent case of Parliament 
v Council
101 in which the Court acknowledged the importance of the Charter. 
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The Court is in a position to send a strong signal to the political leaders that human 
rights ‘matter’ in the third pillar.  
 
Tridimas summarises the prominence of fundamental rights in western societies as 
follows; ‘in an era where there is heightened zeal for the accountability of public 
authorities and the empowerment of the individual, respect for human rights is viewed 
as the sine qua non of legality but as the most important yardstick in assessing a 
polity’s democratic credentials.’ Of course when we are starting from a position of 
weakened democratic credential as is the case with the EU’s third pillar, the greater 
the need for judicial accountability. Van Gerven puts it succinctly when he says the 
less democratic legitimacy a system possesses, particularly in its legislative branch, 
the greater the judicial scrutiny the system should be subjected to.
102  It is clear that by 
placing human rights protections at the heart of the development of an emerging EU 
security and criminal policy, where the decision-making process so obviously lacks 
democratic input, the Court would be simultaneously building on its own 
jurisprudence to protect basic values implicit in the Treaties, reflecting a broad 
political consensus as expressed in the Constitutional Treaty and making an important 
statement about the kind of polity the EU seeks to be. 
   
Conclusions 
The ECJ in its first rulings under the third pillar has revealed its potential for defining 
limits and principles of EU law in the field of criminal cooperation and for lessening 
the negative impacts of the current institutional and legal settlement. The Court looks 
set to play a more extensive and therefore more visible role in the not too distant 
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future as political discussion centre around how best to expand judicial control over 
third pillar issues. However, it remains crucial that any formal legitimacy conferred 
by the legal framework is accompanied by a social legitimacy, which the Court itself 
might foster through the development of a coherent, rational and reasoned body of 
caselaw. History has revealed a broad acceptance of the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
context of the Community law. Even national constitutional courts, have by and large, 
accepted the Court’s more radical constitutional jurisprudence. Arnull, suggests that 
the main influence on the choices made by the Court from the range of possible 
outcomes in a given case is always the need to give effect to the fundamental policy 
preference of the Member State governments the Community legislature.
103  In the 
context of third pillar, where broad political preferences fail to translate easily into 
legislation, and where the developing legal and political environment is often hugely 
contested, a space emergences for the Court to play a more independent role – one 
that is crucial and potentially transformative, but at the same time exceptionally 
challenging and contentious. The stakes and limits are high, but then so too are the 
opportunities. 
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